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Views concerning the appropriate relationship between
church and state are rapidly becoming almost as numerous as
America's religious sects. The Constitution's treatment of reli-
gious liberty, thought by many to be a matter long settled,1 has
now erupted into a many-sided debate. Not only lawyers, judges
and legal commentators are involved; historians and sociologists,
theologians and ecclesiastics, political theorists and statesmen
also participate in the debate.2 It is part of a much larger strug-
gle over a redefinition, or for some a reclamation, of the role of
religion in American public life. At times this debate focuses on
discrete environments, such as public schools and the matter of
prayer. At other times it deals with broader questions such as
religion's influence on fiscal policy, the morality of nuclear weap-
onry, or the direction to be taken by our foreign policy in foster-
ing or opposing political movements in third-world nations.
The debate is as confused as it is many-sided. To the unini-
tiated it seems that the issue is clearly defined as a choice be-
tween two camps: religious groups on one hand and proponents
of a wholly secularized society on the other, with perhaps more
* Copyright 1985 by Carl H. Esbeck
** Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D., 1974, Cornell Univer-
sity; B.S., 1971, Iowa State University.
1. See Miller, The American Theory of Religious Liberty, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION
IN AMERICA 137 (H. Clark II ed. 1982).
2. For just a sampling of the abundance of recent materials, see the following compi-
lations of papers by scholars from several disciplines: CHURCH, STATE, AND POLITICS (J.
Hensel ed. 1981); FREEDOM AND FAITH: THE IMPACT OF LAW ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (L.
Buzzard ed. 1982); FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (H. Clark II ed. 1982); GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (D. Kelley ed. 1982); RELIGION AND POLITICS (J.
Wood ed. 1983); RELIGION AND THE STATE (J. Wood ed. 1985); THE WALL BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Church-State Relations Born Again, TRANSAC-
TION: Soc. Sc. & MODERN SOC'Y, May-June 1984, at 3; Religion, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoas., Spring 1981, at 1;
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moderate positions existing along a line running between these
two polar extremes. However, perplexities defy this linear
model. For instance, some religious adherents have long made
common cause with dedicated secularists in opposing many evi-
dences of religion in public life. So many voices are heard, so
many confident but diverse assertions about how state and
church should interact are made, so many lawsuits are raising
novel issues, and so many seemingly conflicting court decisions
are reported, that bewilderment and uncertainty beset scholars
and laymen alike.
This essay sets forth the five common positions defining the
problem of relations between church and state. Its purpose is to
contribute to mutual understanding among variant and often
contending groups. One of the tools of academia is to classify
and thereby reduce that which is complex to terms that are
manageable for further study. This alone would justify the ty-
pology attempted here, but the burden of this essay is more am-
bitious. This American debate needs a vocabulary that is not
"preloaded" or pejorative so that competing groups might ad-
dress one another with intelligence, fairness and respect. At pre-
sent the discourse is mired in discord. It is far too easy to lose
one's way in the vilification, exaggeration, and other rhetorical
devices now common, and thereby perpetuate the already high
degree of misunderstanding and mistrust.
To be sure, polemics have their place. The issue of church-
state relations is emotionally charged. But there must be a time
for peaceful coming together, and at present no vocabulary ex-
ists to encourage needed opportunities for respite. Moreover,
3. See, e.g., Stark v. St. Cloud State Univ., 802 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1986) (state
university policy of placing student teachers in local parochial schools violates establish-
ment clause); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164
(4th Cir. 1985) (church may discriminate on basis of sex in hiring for pastoral position),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Army's chaplaincy program does not on its face violate establishment clause); Florey v.
Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.) (upholding use of Christmas music
and religious symbols in public school), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980); May v. Evans-
ville-Vanderburg School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986) (public school may bar
small voluntary group prayer meeting of teachers held on school grounds prior to com-
mencement of school day); Ford v. Manuel, 629 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (public
school may not rent facilities before or after regular school hours to community organiza-
tion for purpose of conducting voluntary religion classes); Gay Rights Coalition v. Ge-
orgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 567, (1985) (considering issue of whether church-related uni-
versity may deny recognition to a gay student organization because homosexuality is
inimical to religious doctrine), vacated, 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. 1985).
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without a common language enabling communication, it is diffi-
cult to know when religious liberty is truly threatened. The cur-
rent alarms from all quarters (many in the company of fund-
raising letters) that religious liberty is in imminent danger are
little more than crisis-mongering. Such alarmism, like that of
the fabled child who "cried wolf", is rendering Americans tone
deaf to the more subtle signals that portend genuine loss of
liberty.
When these generalizations about church-state relations are
reduced to only five types, it is inevitable that some refinements
are lost and that the imposed classification is, in a sense, artifi-
cial. Moreover, the effort here is not that of a historian or a com-
parative theologian; it is the limited effort of a systematician
taking a snapshot of the present. A social taxonomy is always
something of a construct. When one moves from the rigidity of a
logical system to the rich complexity of individuals and events,
it becomes evident that many persons and groups will identify
with positions held by two or even three of the following proto-
types but will not feel completely at home in any. Individuals or
organizations may evidence beliefs or traits so varied that pro-
tests will issue that they are being placed into molds that are too
purist for comfort. This is partially because the apparent fea-
tures that enable categorization of an individual are what he
publicly emphasizes, rather than beliefs deeply but privately
held. Others may resist being classified because they have some
agenda that prompt them to avow greater flexibility than this
typology permits. Still others will genuinely evidence traits that
appear idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, this classification has the ad-
vantage of calling attention to the salient points of continuity
and contention held by the major players that comprise this
American debate. Hence, it may also help us to gain orientation
as we are pressed with the immediate question of where America
and, in particular, its judges and lawmakers go from here.
II. THE TYPOLOGY
The distinctions drawn here require a temporary retreat
from the intricate doctrinal analysis that is the forte of legal
commentators. Definitions of sociopolitical consequence cannot
be found merely by tinkering with the tripartite test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman4 or by fine-tuning free exercise clause analysis. 5
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Supreme Court's current test when applying the estab-
371]
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These "black-letter" tests promulgated by the Supreme Court
are simply the end product of deeper promptings. Thus, as a
first step, analysis must reach down through the doctrinal facade
lying on the surface of Supreme Court opinions concerning the
religion clauses and begin to lay bare the foundation principles
that undergird this debate.
Presuppositionally, a person's view of the appropriate rela-
tionship between church and state begins with one's ecclesiology
(i.e., what is the origin and purpose of the church?) and with
one's philosophy of the state (i.e., what is the purpose of civil
government and the scope of its authority?). In the present con-
text, exploration of one of these questions cannot be performed
divorced of the other. No concept of the state is value free6 when
we must address questions like: What people and what overarch-
ing public philosophy control the power of the state? The in-
quiry is compounded because religion in the Western world has
historically had a great deal to say about the values to be incor-
porated into society's concept of the state. A search, then, for
neutral principles of law detached from all religious systems that
will consistently yield results faithful to the first amendment's
embodiment of religious liberty is vanity. There are no such
neutral principles, only juridical constructs that align more with
one presuppositional system than with others.7
History also has some claim on the first amendment in the
present inquiry. America's story of emerging religious liberty can
lishment clause is: (a) the law must have a secular purpose; (b) the principal or primary
effect of the law must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (c) the law
must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
5. There are four steps in every claim brought under the free exercise clause. First,
the claimant must show that his religious belief is sincerely held. Second, the claimant
must show that the government's action burdens his religious belief, i.e., coercion of con-
science is present to a degree that cannot be fairly said to be insignificant. Once the
sincerity and coercion elements are demonstrated, the burden of producing evidence
shifts to the government. At this point the free exercise claimant prevails unless the
state can prove two elements: first, that the societal interests at stake are compelling and
second, that the state cannot achieve its purpose by means less restrictive to conscience.
See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6. Myers, Preface to Religion and the State: The Struggle for Legitimacy and
Power, 483 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 9, 10 (1986).
7. This is why Professor Philip Kurland's RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND
STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962), proposing a "religion blind" state that is indiffer-
ent to whether its actions help or hinder religion, was widely criticized and failed to
interest the courts. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); P. KAUPER,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-19 (1964); Pfeffer, Religion-Blind Government, 15
STAN. L. REv. 389 (1963).
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be a guiding factor," but it is not controlling unless we choose to
make it so. It can hardly be surprising that legal solutions
adopted in a time when America was overwhelmingly Protestant
are today not enthusiastically embraced by Roman Catholics,
Jews, agnostics and non-Western ethnics. History has much to
teach us, particularly about mistakes that cannot be repeated
without great cost.9 Yet history is not demonstrably normative.
The fundamental question for Americans today is not whether
the courts have correctly construed the language of the first
amendment as it was drafted by the First Congress assembled in
New York City in 1789.10 Nor is it what Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison or other prominent statesmen thought about
church-state arrangements. Nor is it a question of whether
America was a "Christian nation" in origin. At its root, one's
view of church-state relations is dependent on one's theological
or philosophical worldview. Historical events are generally cited,
if at all, as makeweight in support of a position held for other
reasons. Only when this is admitted can we start being honest
about why American views on the appropriate relationship of
church and state are as varied as our religious and philosophical
allegiances.
Five views, broadly drawn and yet distinct, can be discerned
as dominating the American debate. In this article, they will be
called strict separationist, pluralistic separationist, institu-
8. Of the many historical accounts of the emergence of religious liberty in America,
including the separation of church and state, some of the more responsible ones are S.
COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREE-
DOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986);
IV. GEWEHR, THE GREAT AWAKENING IN VIRGINIA, 1740-1790 (1930); E. GREENE, RELIGION
AND THE STATE: THE MAKING AND TESTING OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1941); R HANDY,
A CHRISTIAN AMERICA PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES (2d ed. 1984); F.
LITTELL, FROM STATE CHURCH TO PLURALISM (1962); W. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT: THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1964); C. MAXSON, THE GREAT
AWAKENING IN THE MIDDLE COLONIES (1920); S. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE
SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (1963); M. NOLL, N. HATCH & G. MARSDEN, THE
SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA (1983); 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1950); W. SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1942).
9. See generally R. BAINTON, THE TRAVAIL OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1951) (biographi-
cal studies on religious persecutions); R. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS, 1559-1689
(1970); H. LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION (1888) (in 3 volumes).
10. For volumes that devote considerable attention to these debates in the First
Congress, see C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISH-
MENT. FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 123-
42 (1964); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 3-15 (1982); M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AU-
THORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978).
371]
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tional separationist, nonpreferentialist, and restorationist. The
names for these types were selected in part because they carry
little or no baggage from prior use. They succinctly describe a
position without either being opprobrious or giving rhetorical
advantage.
Identifying the elements that define what Americans mean
when they discuss religious liberty is a second prerequisite to
beginning this five-part typology. No universal definition of the
term religious liberty exists. Thus, in this essay, religious liberty
will be subdivided into three elemental questions:
1. How should government protect the freedom of religious
expression and attendant associational rights? This issue is
presently addressed in the courts under the first amendment's
speech," press," assembly' s ane petition clauses, and the im-
11. For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the rights protected by the
free speech clause, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (state university
cannot, consistent with the "rights of speech and association," deny student religious
groups access to facilities provided to all other recognized student groups); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (reversing conviction of Baptist minister who gave inflam-
matory sermon on public street after being denied permit to hold a meeting, as a prior
restraint on the right to speak); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (holding
unconstitutional as a "previous restraint on the right of free speech" an ordinance used
to deny use of loud-speaker in park by Jehovah's Witness); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness for breach of the peace
and failure to have permit to solicit money and sell literature as contrary to free exercise
of religion and "freedom to communicate information and opinion"); cf. Heffron v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding restric-
tions on the sale, exhibition and distribution of printed material at state fair as reasona-
ble time, place, and manner restrictions on the right to communicate); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (holding that conviction of Jehovah's Wit-
ness for violating law against using "fighting words" did not reasonably impinge upon
the "privilege of free speech").
12. For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the rights protected by the
free press clause, see Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 520 (1946) (consistent with "free-
dom of press and religion," state cannot punish Jehovah's Witness engaged in distribu-
tion of literature in village owned by United States); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
505 (1946) (trespass conviction of Jehovah's Witness for distribution of literature in com-
pany-owned town reversed because of "freedom of press and religion"); Follett v. Town
of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944) (license tax on sales of literature imposed on
resident minister selling religious books contrary to the "[fireedom of religion"); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness
who violated a city ordinance concerning door-to-door solicitation and distribution of
handbills as invalid denial of "freedom of speech and press"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1943) (striking down license fee required by solicitation ordinance
when applied to Jehovah's Witness selling religious literature door-to-door as contrary to
the "[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion"); Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness under ordinance forbid-
ding distribution of religious publications without permit as abridging "freedom of reli-
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and petition clauses, and the implied freedom of thought.14
2. How should government protect religious-based con-
science? 15 This issue is presently addressed in the courts under
the first amendment's free exercise clause.
1 6
gion, of the press and of speech"); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943) (ordinance
restricting distribution on city street of handbills bearing religious message as restraint
on "freedom of press and religion"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (convic-
tion of Jehovah's Witness for canvassing without a permit as abridging "freedom of
speech and press"); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting distribution of handbills without permit was restraint on "freedom of
the press" of Jehovah's Witness).
13. For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the rights protected by the
freedom of assembly clause, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (discrimi-
natory denial of permit to Jehovah's Witness to hold services in public park is preferring
one religious group over others); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (dis-
criminatory denial of permit to Jehovah's Witnesses to use city park for public gathering
denied "equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of. . . freedoms of speech and reli-
gion"); cf. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (sustaining conviction of Jeho-
vah's Witness for conducting a religious meeting in part without a license); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding conviction of group of Jehovah's Witnesses
who paraded without required permit because law was found to be a fairly enforced and
precisely drawn time, place, and manner regulation).
14. For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the implied first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of thought, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15
(1977) (sustaining claim by Jehovah's Witness that motor vehicle license plate bearing
the motto "Live Free or Die" violates freedom of thought guarantee which includes the
"right to refrain from speaking at all"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961)
(religious test for public office invades "freedom of belief and religion"); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of reli-
gious belief, is based in a society of free men."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance "invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit").
15. One of the elements of a free exercise clause claim (see supra note 5) is that a
religious claimant must show coercion of conscience. Although this can be difficult for
the claimant to prove, the Supreme Court has held that coercion is not restricted solely
to situations involving state prohibitions of religious conduct or state requirements of
conduct that are contrary to faith. Burdens that only indirectly require a claimant to
make a "cruel choice" between religious faith and obedience to government will suffice.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-
18 (1981), stated the coercion of conscience element in this way:
Where the state [a.] conditions receipt of an important benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by a religious faith, or [b.] where it denies such a benefit be-
cause of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists.
As used in this article, coercion of conscience is to be understood in the sense of the
"cruel choice" test set forth in Thomas.
16. The free exercise clause secures religious liberty for each individual by prohibit-
ing the invasion of conscience by civil authority. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
248-49 (1968) (no free exercise clause violation in the absence of a claim that statute in
question coerced individuals in the practice of their religion); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (unlike establishment clause claim, "it is necessary in a free
371]
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3. What is the appropriate relationship of government with
religious organizations and religious practices? This issue is
presently addressed in the courts under the first amendment's
establishment clause. 17
Utilizing this breakdown of religious liberty, the views gen-
erally held by each of the five types discussed in this essay will
be compared and contrasted along the following grid:
a. the purpose and jurisdiction of government, and the nature
of religion;
b. the juridical protection accorded religious speech;
c. the degree of autonomy accorded a church or other reli-
gious organization;
d. discrimination by the state in the distribution of goods and
opportunities, among religious groups and between the reli-
gious and those professing no religion; and
e. the juridical protection accorded religious-based
conscience.
A detailed comparison follows, but the chief differences be-
tween the five types are easily summarized. Strict separationists
are alone in regarding religion as a private and individual phe-
nomenon that should little influence public affairs and matters
of state. Strict separationism is the only model unwilling to rec-
ognize ontological status in the law for churches and other reli-
gious organizations. To the extent that religious societies have
exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion"); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21
(1980) (women's association lacked standing to assert free exercise claim that Hyde
Amendment violated its raligious-based conscientious belief that abortion was necessary
because association's members admitted being divided over the imperative to have abor-
tions); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause, unlike the
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compul-
sion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-31 (1961) (different standing requirements for two religion
clauses because establishment clause goes beyond insuring an individual's free exercise of
religion).
17. Unlike the other rights guaranteed by the first amendment that protect individ-
ual liberties (see supra notes 11-14), including the free exercise clause (see supra note
16), the establishment clause focuses on a structural concern, namely, mediating the rela-
tionship between church and state. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 129-
38 (1981); see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 94 (1980).
This point is further developed in Esbeck, Toward a General Theory of Church-State
Relations and the First Amendment, 4 ST. Louis PUB. L.F. 325 (1985); Esbeck, Estab-
lishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1984) [hereinafter Establishment Clause Limits].
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legal defenses against interference by the state, these defenses
are merely the sum of individual rights derived from the organi-
zation's members.
Pluralistic separationists reject the notion that the state is
subject to and beneficiary of any "higher law," regarding such
talk as civil religion, that is, a tendency toward self-righteous
nationalism fueled by nativist religion. They view the modern
nation-state as strictly a human invention, rather than an entity
divinely instituted.
Institutional separationists maintain that an ultimate
worldview transcends and unifies the state, and thus limits the
state by holding it accountable to this "higher law." This over-
arching public philosophy is deemed properly theistic and is
heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian thought, as is the history
and tradition of all Western nations.
Nonpreferentialists would permit government to favor reli-
gion on a basis that does not prefer one religion over another.
Thus, unlike the three separationist models, nonpreferentialists
would allow the state to aid religion in general while not aiding
those professing no religious belief.
Restorationists, finally, are the only type that would bind
the state to a particular confession of faith and would assign
civic officials limited duties in defense of the dominant religion.
III. STRICT SEPARATIONISTS
Strict separationists desire a secular state. By "secular"
they mean a state that is decidedly nonreligious, but not neces-
sarily hostile to religion. They urge that great care be taken to
insulate government and public affairs from the influence of
traditional religion.18 As a slogan, strict separationists cite the
18. A hermetic seal between civil affairs and religion is, of course, not presently pos-
sible in America. Strict separationists readily acknowledge this; nevertheless, they advo-
cate such absolutism as an aspirational goal:
Those defending the strict separationist interpretation of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause recognize that the absolute separation of
church and state is not possible, but what does that prove? Does the reality
that no person is immortal mean that the medical and pharmaceutical profes-
sion should be abolished? Realistic separationists recognize that the absolute
separation of church and state cannot be achieved, else what's a secularist
heaven for? Nevertheless, that is the direction they would have constitutional
law relating to the Religion Clause take, fully aware that perfection will never
be reached.
L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT Xi (1984).
371]
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Jeffersonian metaphor of a high and impregnable wall between
church and state.
Because they aspire to a government unalloyed by even ves-
tiges of religion from bygone days,19 strict separationists are
working out the logical implications of a distinction between
church and state that matches the distinction between religious
and secular. Thus, they argue not only for a separation of church
and state, but also for a separation of traditional religion from
all civic matters.20
Strict separationists themselves may be active members of a
church or synagogue and devoted to a particular faith, or they
may profess no religious persuasion. Many are ethnic and reli-
gious minorities who genuinely fear discrimination and other
forms of intolerance should conservative Christian majorities be
positioned to influence in any serious way matters of public law.
Although others often accuse strict separationists of being anti-
religious or irreligious, this charge does not apply to all or even
to many strict separationists. However, being both religious and
committed to strict separationism does have theological conse-
quences. Strict separationists who hold religious beliefs are in-
19. The following lawsuits demonstrate the strict separationist position: Friedman v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir.) (en banc), rev'g 781 F.2d 786 (10th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986) (suit to enjoin official county seal, which
had symbols representing historic role of Spain and the Roman Catholic Church in set-
tlement of Southwest and which had been used for many years); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (suit to declare chaplaincy program of Army in violation of estab-
lishment clause); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970) (suit to remove
words "In God We Trust" from U.S. currency); Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v.
Board of Regents, 72 Wash. 2d 912, 436 P.2d 189, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960 (1968) (suit
to enjoin state college English course dealing with literary features of the Bible). See also
Lewis v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 867, 200 N.E.2d 767, 252 N.Y.S.2d 80, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
923 (1964), in which the New York Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion a decision
of the Appellate Division, 11 A.D.2d 447, 207 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1960), sustaining a trial
court's dismissal of an action to enjoin regulation inserting phrase "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance recommended for recitation by public school children.
20. See M. HARRINGTON, THE PoLITIcs AT GoD's FUNERAL (1983). For a jeremiad
against strict separationism by a well-known political conservative, see Sobran, Pensees:
Notes for the Reactionary Tomorrow, NAT'L RE., Dec. 3, 1985, at 23, 47-50.
It was this strict separationist line of thought that prompted one of the plaintiff's
arguments in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). A sharply divided Court in Harris
upheld the Hyde Amendment, which barred federally funded abortions in most in-
stances. Plaintiffs asserted that the establishment clause was violated, basing their argu-
ments upon evidence that the Hyde Amendment was consistent with the religious tenets
of the Roman Catholic Church. The Court disagreed. Id. at 319-20. See also Abortion
Rights Mobilization v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (action to remove tax ex-
empt status of Roman Catholic Church for allegedly intervening in electoral process to
support anti-abortion and oppose pro-abortion candidates).
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clined to be dualistic in mind." When an individual deter-
minedly strives to keep his public life secular, his religious life
becomes increasingly consigned to that which is private. Such
persons internalize the axiom that the place for religion is fam-
ily, home, and church. Religion survives-indeed, for some it
thrives-but as a privatized phenomenon.22
An additional related consequence of religious dualism is
that religion is regarded as a highly individualistic matter.23 Re-
ligion is thereby left vulnerable to marginalization by those un-
sympathetic to it. For example, those professing little or no reli-
gious faith patronize it: they acknowledge religion to be of
therapeutic value as one way of "coping with" the complexities
of modern life, but view it as embarrassing or even publicly of-
fensive when believers "foist" their religion on others. They view
a church as little more than an individual's "support group."
In the public sphere, civic issues and affairs of state are to
be debated and resolved in a wholly secularized medium, since
religious views are effectually leached of any serious public con-
sequence. Education, 24 law, 25 economics or military defense are
declared to be secular and are to be publicly debated in such
terms. For persons whose religions counsel the integration of
faith with the totality of life, tensions necessarily result from im-
position of such a dualistic motif.
In contrast to the other four types, strict separationists gen-
erally hold that no universal, transcendent point of reference or
ethical system exists or is required for judging the state. Al-
though ethical constructs can be helpful, strict separationists
hold that ultimately matters of politics and statecraft are rela-
tive. "Relative" does not mean value-free, but that one's choice
of values is not judged right or wrong by reference to an external
and immutable natural law. Strict separationists view higher
21. R. MACAULAY & J. BARRs, BEING HUMAN: THE NATURE OF SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE
53-55 (1978) (warning against such a secular-sacred dichotomy).
22. See Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause
Cases, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 275 (1986) (warning against such a privatization).
23. Cf. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 219-49 (1985).
24. Henry, The Crisis of Modern Learning: God in the University Classroom, Im-
PRIMIS, Feb. 1984, at 2. One can see this idea at work by examining textbooks widely used
in primary and secondary public schools. Textbooks have been almost entirely denuded
of any reference to religion generally, and of Christianity in particular. P. ViTZ, RELIGION
& TRADITIONAL VALUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1985).
25. See generally Symposium: The Secularization of the Law, 31 MERCER L. REV.
401 (1980).
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law, if it exists at all, as indeterminate in any event. Liberal po-
litical theory26  and pragmatic instrumentalism 27 direct their
thinking.
Strict separationists protect religious expression under the
first amendment, for as a general proposition they oppose con-
tent-based distinctions on speech.28 Nonetheless, a few recent
cases suggest that strict separationists may place a lesser value
on religious speech in the marketplace of ideas.29 Religious
speech is not an equal player with, for example, political, philo-
sophical or artistic expression. Strict separationists believe that
little harm will occur if religious speech is not given unimpeded
access to the public marketplace, and that some good may re-
sult. They reason that traditional religions properly have a di-
minished influence on public policy in our highly rational and
technological modern age. Religious strife and even wars, past
and present, evidence the danger of division along religious lines
within the civil polity. 0 In their minds, this warrants modest ad-
26. See W. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1982), for a critique of
the amoral instrumentalism of liberal political theory by an author on the political left.
27. Pragmatic instrumentalism is presently the dominant legal theory in American
law. It is an amalgamation of utilitarianism, sociology, and certain ideas inherited from
legal realism. The principal elements of pragmatic instrumentalism postulate as follows:
law should seek to maximize the satisfaction of the wants and interests of citizens; forms
of law are essentially instruments that serve goals external to law; lawmakers ought to
turn mainly to social science and democratic processes in fashioning law's means and
goals; valid law is whatever has been enacted or promulgated; law ultimately is reduced
to predictions of official behavior; law and morals are sharply separable; forms of law
should be interpreted and applied in light of social policy rather than formalistically; law
accomplishes its objectives mainly through coercive force; and the use of law is to be
judged mainly by its effects. See R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982).
28. See supra notes 11-14.
29. This line of thought is evident among those who would bar speech of a religious
nature from a limited public forum as violative of the establishment clause. See, e.g.,
Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally
divided Court, McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (community use of public
park for Christmas holiday display); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state uni-
versity student-activity meeting rooms); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (school district allowed to bar non-denominational student
prayer group from meeting during high school student-activity period), vacated on other
grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986); Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (action to remove tax exempt status of Roman Catholic Church for al-
legedly intervening in electoral process to support anti-abortion and oppose pro-abortion
candidates).
30. For example, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947), the Court
noted:
The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the coloniza-
tion of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, gen-
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ditional restrictions on religious expression in highly fragile en-
vironments, such as public schools, 31 so as to prevent any mis-
perception that government and religion are not totally separate.
Strict separationists view churches and other religious orga-
nizations as having no institutional rights other than the deriva-
tive legal rights of their members. That is, a church qua church
has no defense to governmental interference in its affairs apart
from the free exercise rights of individual church members. This
view is based on the jurisprudential theory, dominant among
strict separationists, that only individuals hold legal rights. It
follows that the state properly refuses to grant religious societies
ontological status and standing as rights holders apart from
their members.2
erated in large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute
political and religious supremacy. With the power of government supporting
them, at various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Prot-
estants had persecuted Catholics, Prostestant sects had persecuted other Pros-
testant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of an-
other shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews.
See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971) (political divisiveness along
religious lines as impermissible entanglement); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that
kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is
apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.").
31. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984)
(school district allowed to bar non-denominational student prayer club from meeting
during high school activity period), vacated on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986);
May v. Evansville-Vanderburg School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (public
school may bar small, voluntary group prayer meeting of teachers held on school grounds
prior to commencement of school day) afl'd, 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986). Consider also
the views of those who opposed the Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, Title VIII, 98
Stat. 1267, 1302-04 (1984), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74, found in S. REP. No. 357,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) and H.R. REP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
32. A good example of the clash of views concerning the ontological nature of
churches is found in Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766
F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986). Dayton Chris-
tian involved a charge of sex discrimination by a teacher who was dismissed for religious
reasons from a church-related primary school.
So long as the members of a religious organization are united in their claim for pro-
tection from governmental interference, it is not necessary to determine whether reli-
gious liberty extends to the church qua church or, on the other hand, whether it extends
to the church as a mere vehicle for the collective expression of individual rights. How-
ever, when, as in Dayton Christian, members of a church are divided and one individ-
ual's right to equality in employment is pitted against a church's claim of autonomy from
state intervention, it becomes crucial to determine whether the law recognizes ontological
status in the church. The idea that religious societies have independent constitutional
value is fundamentally a denial of the proposition that rights can ultimately reside only
in individuals and associations therefore have no such rights. This point is explored fur-
ther in Establishment Clause Limits, supra note 17, at 369-74 (1984).
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For strict separationists, conscience informed by religious
belief is to be vigorously protected from coercive state action.33
They are on the forefront of litigation on behalf of discrete reli-
gious minorities, for such groups are often the first to suffer in-
tolerance by means of legislation adopted by the larger political
community. Moreover, there is a tendency among some strict
separationists to broaden this free exercise clause protection to
all conscientious objectors, religious and otherwise.3 This is
done by defining "religion" broadly for free exercise clause pur-
poses (although not for establishment clause purposes) so as to
protect any philosophically based conscience, rather than just
beliefs arising from traditional religion. 5
When conscience is discussed, the commentary occasionally
implies a state duty to not "offend" minority religions, as in
causing a member of the political community to feel like an out-
sider.3 Strict separationists concede, albeit reluctantly, that to
33. Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115 (1973).
34. Under present Supreme Court case law, only religiously based freedom of con-
science is protected by the free exercise clause. Dissent or acts of civil disobedience,
however sincere or motivated by deeply-held concerns, that are not grounded in one's
religion are simply not addressed by the clause and would not demand a constitutionally
required exemption from the law. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). Compare Justice Douglas' dissent in Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 465-66 (1971), in which he argues that the first
amendment implies a right of conscience whether or not religion gave rise to the deeply
held belief.
35. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826-33 (1978); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1056 (1978). For an excellent
discussion of the problem of defining religion for purposes of the first amendment, and a
rejection of the two-definition thesis, see Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir.
1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
36. See Richard John Neuhaus' excellent essay on the "duty not to give offense"
argument occasionally heard from strict separationists:
[I]f the rule is that we must give no offense, the American people must be
silent in public about who they are and what they believe ...
...What we cannot do . ..is to ask the law to muzzle others in the
community because we are offended by what they are saying about what they
believe.
There is, of course, the danger of a tyrannical majoritarianism. That is
why we have democracy with its institutional protections of minorities. But the
minority cannot be protected, and should not want to be protected, from the
public evidence that it is in fact a minority. The attempt to do that leads to
what might be called tyrannical minoritarianism. That is what Prof. Tribe
seems to be proposing when he argues that we should "refuse to surround pub-
lic institutions with symbols of sanctity." At the same time, he wants us to be
"a country in which all the divergent streams of conscience, belief, and dissent
can unite in a powerful current, one that will move us forward together, with
many religious faiths but as one people." But how is this noble vision of "one
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not "give offense" (even when "offense" is measured by some
objective standard) embraces considerably more than a duty to
refrain from state action coercive to conscience.3
IV. PLURALISTIC SEPARATIONISTS
Pluralistic separationists desire a neutral state. By "neu-
tral" they mean a state that doggedly avoids taking sides for or
against religion and religious organizations. The phrase "a free
church in a free state" captures their position. Each, within its
own jurisdiction, is to remain independent of the other."
Like strict separationists, this second type draws a dichot-
omy between secular and religious. By confining its attention to
the secular realm, government maintains the desired neutrality.
But the dichotomy drawn by pluralistic separationists is not as
sharp or absolute as that of the strict separationists. Rather, the
division is often phrased in terms of "public" and "private"
realms."9 Religious values may influence government policy if
the policy concerns a "public" matter. Many pluralistic separa-
tionists have a history of political involvement in the prevention
of vice and the regulation of personal morality. Their religious
views have had a civic impact in matters such as regulation of
people" to be publicly asserted if we exclude the language, stories and symbols
that are derived from the streams of conscience, belief and religious faith af-
firmed by the people who are that "one people"?
Neuhaus, Exclusions Racial and Religious, 3 RELIGION & Soc'Y REP., Feb. 1986, at 2-3.
37. See supra note 15 for an explanation of the term "coercion of conscience" as
used in this article.
38. For materials representative of the pluralistic separationist position, see Dunn,
Reflections, REP. FROM CAPITAL, Oct. 1985, at 15; Gaustad, Toward a Baptist Identity in
the Twenty-First Century, RaP. FROM CAPrAL, June 1985, at 4-7; Grenz, Isaac Backus
and His Vision of Church-State Relationships: "Sweet Harmony," REP. FROM CAPITAL,
Mar. 1985, at 4; Linder, Christianity, Politics, and Secular Government in the United
States, 26 Sw. J. THEOLOGY, Spring 1984, at 46; Maring, Baptists, Religious Liberty and
a Democratic State, REP. FROM CAPITAL, Feb. 1986, at 4; Miller, The Principle of Reli-
gious Liberty, 6 J. CHURCH & ST. 85 (1964); Tanenbaum, Religious Liberty in America:
Lessons of the Past, Implications for the Future, CHURCH & ST. ABROAD, Aug. 1984, at 3;
Tate, The Faith of Our Fathers, REP. FROM CAPITAL, March 1984, at 4-5. See generally
DISSENT IN CHURCH AND STATE (J. Baker ed. 1970).
39. See Kennedy, A Plea for Respect, RELIGION & PUB. EDUC., Winter-Spring 1984,
at 26, 28-29 (speech by Senator Edward Kennedy at Liberty Baptist College, in which he
takes the position that nuclear freeze and political violence in Central America are public
matters proper for religious persuasion, but that abortion, the existence of a Department
of Education and a balanced budget constitutional amendment were not proper subjects
for "heavenly appeals"); Krauthanmer, The Church-State Debate, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
17 & 24, 1984, at 15 (critiquing the public-private dichotomy); see also Greenawalt, Re-
ligiously Based Premises and Laws Restrictive of Liberty, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 245.
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gambling, pornography, and alcohol. Others have historically
concentrated on peace issues. 40 Still others have focused on labor
and social welfare legislation. The point is that the forays of plu-
ralistic separationists into public affairs have often been selec-
tive or partial. Many from a Pietistic (spiritual-temporal dichot-
omy) or Anabaptist (faithful-worldly dichotomy)41 background
have had this sporadic political involvement, because their sepa-
rationist theology has told them that "politics is dirty" and is
thus to be avoided on a sustained and comprehensive basis.
More important, among pluralistic separationists there is
near universal emphasis on civic tolerance as the proper way to
deal with America's religious pluralism.42 Pluralism is a fact in
America" s which none in our five-part typology would deny.
However, pluralistic separationists regard religious pluralism as
not only a fact that must be acknowledged, but as the proper
state of affairs. Pluralistic separationists view with favor the "ri-
val sects" theory of how religious liberty is maintained." This
concept, often attributed to James Madison, 45 suggests that reli-
gious liberty is achieved when diverse religious sects freely com-
pete, but with none dominating. The model assumes that if one
or even a few sects should become dominant, the ambition of
40. See, e.g., Wallis, Without a Vision the People Perish, 9 SOJOURNERS 3 (1980).
41. For helpful background into the origins and beliefs of European Anabaptists
and their influence on current American denominations, see W. ESTEP, THE ANABAPTIST
STORY (2d ed. 1975).
42. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 39.
43. There are more than 600 "unconventional alternative religious bodies" and
nearly 800 major Christian denominations in America. J. MELTON & R. MOORE, THE CULT
EXPERIENCE: RESPONDING TO THE NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 7 (1982). YEARBOOK OF
AMERICAN AND CANADIAN CHURCHES 1986, at 234-41 (1986) lists 219 denominations, con-
sisting of 344,410 churches with membership of over 142 million, representing about 60"
of the United States population. B. QUINN, H. ANDERSON, M. BRADLEY, P. GOETTING & P.
SHRIVER, CHURCHES AND CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 1980, at 1-3 (1982),
lists 111 denominations, consisting of 231,708 churches with membership of over 112.5
million, representing 49.7% of the population.
44. See, e.g., Tate, supra note 38.
45. "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the
other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the
number of interests and sects .... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison) (Sig-
net ed. 1961). See W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
114-17 (1985); Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, 1901 AM. HIST. ASS'N ANN.
REP. 165 (1902); L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 816-18 (1978). See generally Drakeman,
Religion and the Republic: James Madison and the First Amendment, 25 J. CHURCH &
ST. 427 (1983).
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clerics to promote their own church would eventually lead to loss
of civil liberties for all others.
Although pluralistic separationists accept that religion may
influence issues of civic government, they shun any religiously
generated cultural mandate to employ the offices of government
to achieve religious ends. Pluralistic separationists often prefer
to posture themselves in the prophetic role. They are the ones
outside the chambers of power, critiquing the state and calling it
back to its true course. A prophet's role as dissenter is in contra-
distinction to the priestly function of a religious insider who,
through self-interest, lapses into conserving and securing the ex-
isting social and political order. Pluralistic separationists view
tension between church and state as desirable, because it is a
sign of a church which is vital and has not succumbed to the
allure of political power.47 Their literature counsels one to be a
sojourner in this world, rather than to be of this world.
Pluralistic separationists do not believe that a universal,
transcendent point of reference or ethical system for judging the
state is required. Admittedly, individual persons have
worldviews, many religious in nature, that they believe tran-
scend and thus limit the state. But the modern nation-state is
not legally "bound" to any particular worldview or public theol-
ogy. The state can and should be neutral toward these various
religious subscriptions," since the state is not competent to de-
termine which of these competing worldviews might be correct.
49
Moreover, an overarching public theology is to be avoided as ap-
46. See Marty, Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELI-
GION 139 (R. Richey & D. Jones eds. 1974).
47. The role of dissenter in their story is venerated. See, e.g., DISSENT IN CHURCH
AND STATE (J. Baker ed. 1970); Gaustad, supra note 38.
48. See, eg., Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE FREE
SocILv 23, 30 (1985):
The problems ... for a pluralist society are obvious. The democratic soci-
ety as such is committed to no theology or ideology . . . it is simply a civil
community; its unity is purely political, consisting in "agreement on the good
of man at the level of performance without the necessity of agreement on ulti-
mates." Democracy has properly been described as a forum in which ultimates
compete; but the competition must not become internecine; if it does the dem-
ocratic community itself is shattered.
49. For a critique of the pluralistic separationist's apparent assumption that societal
pluralism can be boundless without adverse consequences, see Canavan, The Pluralist
Game, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 23; Hitchcock, Church, State, and
Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1981, at 3,
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proaching civil religion.50 Civil religion, a term with many conno-
tations,5' is used by pluralistic separationists in the pejorative
sense of dominant religious sentiments being used to sanctify
political expediencies. Where there is civil religion, the church
has been prostituted to serve those holding civil power.
The modern state is democratic and instrumental. Pluralis-
tic separationists view it as being of human invention, rather
than ordained by God. The state is not "one nation, under God,"
in any sense of a particularized omnipresence legally obligating
the state. Rather, through popular sovereignty (majority rule),
the state is to respond with equality and tolerance to all citizens,
both those from the plurality of faiths and those without reli-
gious belief.
Religious speech and press receive juridical protection on a
parity with, for example, expressions of political, philosophical
or artistic content, for religious faith may speak to civil affairs. 2
However, religious believers properly influence the state "from
the ground up," beginning with their own spiritual regeneration,
not through an appeal to a superceding religious "higher law" or
worldview imposed from the top down.
In contrast to strict separationists, plural separationists
maintain that religious organizations have distinct institutional
rights, not merely the derivative free exercise rights of individ-
ual members.5 3 They reason that religious societies have a
sphere in which they operate unhindered in accordance with
their understanding of their own divine origin and mission.
Roger Williams' oft-repeated biblical allusion to "the garden and
the wilderness ' 54 illustrates the state's lack of competence in
church matters. State involvement only tramples the garden.
Pluralistic separationists would prohibit official discrimina-
50. R. LINDER & R. PIERARD, TWILIGHT OF THE SAINTS: BIBLICAL CHRISTIANITY & CIVIL
RELIGION IN AMERICA 135-86 (1978).
51. On the matter of civil religion generally, see AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (R.
Richey & D. Jones eds. 1974); THE RELIGION OF THE REPUBLIC (E. Smith ed. 1971); Bel-
lah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967); Linder, Civil Religion in Historical
Perspective: The Reality that Underlies the Concept, 17 J. CHURCH & ST. 399 (1975).
52. Tate, supra note 38, at 4-5.
53. See Linder, supra note 38, at 62 (1984); J. WOOD, GOVERNMENT INTRUSION INTO
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (1980); Wamble, Figment or Fidelity, REP. FROM CAPITAL, Jan. 1985,
at 7 (quoting from a confession of faith adopted by Southern Baptist Conventions in
1925 stating, inter alia, "[t]he state owes to the church protection and full freedom in the
pursuit of its spiritual ends").
54. See M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-6 (1965).
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tion among religious groups and, like all three separationist
types, would disallow discrimination favoring religion over non-
religion.55
Finally, pluralistic separationists vigorously protect reli-
gious-based conscience. Only upon a showing of some truly exi-
gent threat to public health, safety, or public order would plural-
istic separationists allow the state to override conscience. More
than any other type, pluralistic separationists have suffered offi-
cial intolerance, which often accompanied their historic role as
dissenters defying the established order.56 Thus, this second
type is particularly vigilant in safeguarding conscience. Those
who have suffered intolerance in America for their beliefs, such
as Seventh-day Adventists, Christian Scientists and Jehovah's
Witnesses, are often pluralistic separationists, as are those in the
historic Baptist tradition and the present-day descendants of
Anabaptists and Pietists, such as Mennonites, Amish, Brethren
and the Friends (Quakers).
V. INSTITUTIONAL SEPARATIONISTS
Institutional separationists envision a theocentric state, in
which the state's neutrality is deemed "benevolent" 57 or "whole-
some."58 The institutional separation of church and state is a
model wherein both institutions are of divine ordination and are
subject to the will and rule of God, who is sovereign over all
things. Each institution is distinct and is designed to perform
different tasks in the created order. Neither is to dominate the
other, nor are they to be mutually dependent. But a functional
55. Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947): "The 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." (emphasis added). This dictum by
Justice Black prohibiting even nonpreferential aid to all religions continues to carry a
large majority on the Supreme Court. Compare Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.
Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985) (requiring government to "maintain a course of neutrality among
religions, and between religion and non-religion") with Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2508 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (purpose of establishment clause is to for-
bid preference of one religion over another).
56. See, e.g., W. EsTEP, supra note 41; ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALIN-
ISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968); 1 & 2 W. McLoUGHLIN, NEw ENG-
LAND DISSENT. 1630-1833: BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1971).
57. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
58. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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interaction between church and state is inevitable and desirable
as each pursues its own proper objectives. 59
Although institutional separationists may at first appear to
tend toward theocracy, that is not the case. The nature of this
God-in-Common is purposely left ambiguous. When God is men-
tioned in a public setting, it is only by generalizations such as
"Supreme Being," the "Creator of us all," "Nature's God" or in
the national motto, "In God We Trust."60 Nevertheless, He is
not an all-purpose, generic god. Rather, this God accords gener-
59. A concise statement of this position is found in CHURCH AND STATE: A LUTHERAN
PERSPECTIVE 1-2, adopted by the Lutheran Church in America (Division for Mission in
North America, Lutheran Church in America June 1966):
[T]he Lutheran Church in America affirms both institutional separation
and functional interaction as the proper relationship between church and state.
We hold that both church and state in their varied organized expressions, are
subject to the will and rule of God, who is sovereign over all things. By "insti-
tutional separation" we mean that church and state must each be free to per-
form its essential task under God. Thus we reject those theories of relationship
which seek the dominance either of church over state or of state over church.
. ..The church militant is both a divine organism related to Christ and a
human organization related to society. Its distinctive mission as an ecclesiasti-
cal institution is to proclaim the Word of God in preaching and sacraments,
worship and evangelism, Christian education and social ministry.
"Civil authority," according to the New Testament, is divinely ordained.
This does not imply that every particular government or governor enjoys God's
approval; it means rather that "civil authority" which is manifested in the
state is to be respected and obeyed as an expression of the sovereign will of the
Creator.
This forbids any state from deifying itself, for its power is not inherent but
is delegated to it by God to be employed responsibly for the attainment of
beneficial secular goals. A government is accountable to God for the way in
which it uses, abuses, or neglects to use its powerful civil "sword." The con-
stant need of the state, therefore, is not for the church's uncritical loyalty and
unquestioning obedience but for the prophetic guidance and judgment of the
law of God, which the church is commanded to proclaim, in order to be re-
minded of both its secular limits and potentialities. The distinctive mission of
the state is to establish civil justice through the maintenance of law and order,
the protection of constitutional rights, and the promotion of the general wel-
fare of the total citizenry.
"Functional interaction" describes a process which takes place in areas in
which church and state, each in pursuit of its own proper objectives, are both
legitimately engaged. We believe that such interaction is appropriate so long as
institutional separation is preserved and neither church nor state seeks to use
its type of involvement to dominate the other. We, therefore, reject theories of
absolute separation of church and state which would deny practical expressions
of functional interaction.
60. The most frequently quoted attribution to God is from Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (Douglas, J.): "We are a religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being."
HeinOnline  -- 1986 BYU L. Rev. 390 1986
VIEWS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
ally-if vaguely-with the personal, historical deity of Judeo-
Christianity and the monotheism prevalent in the western world.
Institutional separationists hold that a universal, transcen-
dent point of reference or ethical system for the state exists and
is required in order to secure human rights and maintain a re-
publican structure of government."1 Western nations, particu-
larly the United States, are influenced by and indebted to the
personal and historical concept of God within Judeo-Christian-
ity.s2 History is witness, maintains this third type, that of all
sociopolitical constructs only the cultural ethos derived from
Judeo-Christianity has successfully (if not consistently) served
as a hedge against totalitarianism. 3
Institutional separationists admit that the United States is
not "bound" to a theocentric public theology, in the sense of a
particularized positive law superior to the Constitution. None-
theless, this overarching worldview is precedent to be followed.
One must distinguish between law and the source of law. Thus,
America's abandonment of Judeo-Christianity as the source of
law would imperil the legitimacy of democratic institutions and
undermine the "higher law" rationale for human rights.6 4 Under
this view, if there is no notion of the transcendent, the state has
no limits to hold it in check. If there is no higher appeal, one
cannot truthfully say, "No state is above the law." It is no an-
swer, according to institutional separationists, to argue that the
higher appeal is to "the people."'6 5 Absent firm moorings in God,
61. The necessity of a socio-religious consensus undergirding and stabilizing the
state's political power has been advanced by a number of writers. See, e.g., C. DAWSON,
RELIGION AND THE MODERN STATE (1940); J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 80-85
(1960); R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE. RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
60, 138 (1984); A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 340-60 (1985); Bellah,
Cultural Pluralism and Religious Particularism, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 33
(H. Clark II ed. 1981); Nussbaum, A Garment for the Naked Public Square: Nurturing
American Public Theology, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 53 (1985).
62. See Stackhouse, Democracy and the World's Religions, THIS WORLD, Winter/
Spring 1982, at 108.
63. Littell, The Basis of Religious Liberty in Christian Belief, 6 J. CHURCH & ST.
132, 138-41 (1964); see M. STACKHOUSE, CREEDS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A STUDY IN
THREE CULTURES (1984) (comparative study of basis of human rights in United States,
India and Marxist East Germany).
64. Kirk, We Cannot Separate Christian Morals and The Rule of Law, IMPRIMIS,
April 1983, reprinted in 4 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y Q., 1983 no. 4, at 21.
65. A. STORKEY, A CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 312-13 (1979). In contrast, plural-
istic separationists place reliance in the democratic expression of "the people." Tate,
supra note 38.
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they see a danger that rule by "the people," because of their
fallen state, become tyranny by the majority.6
Institutional separationists view religious speech and press
as deserving juridical protection equal to that given political,
philosophical or artistic expression. A rule against content-based
discrimination applies to all expression, because institutional
separationists hold that religious values not only may, but must
influence public policy. 7 Their position, in short, is that a
church separated from the state need not, indeed, must not be a
silent church. Individuals of this third type believe that part of
one's religious duty is preserving the good in culture and re-
forming the bad. They unashamedly teach a cultural mandate
that arises out of their religion. Moreover, this mandate is not
limited to interest-group politics or single-issue moral crusades.
Rather, the commission is to work for the well-being of all
citizens."'
Although they agree with pluralistic separationists that civil
religion (in the pejorative sense of that term) is harmful, institu-
tional separationists believe that the threat of civil religion in
America is presently exaggerated.6 9 Admittedly, history has
shown that religious people have difficulty loving both God and
country without confusing the two. However, institutional
separationists believe that it is still possible to avoid both denial
of religious liberty to minority groups and churches' succumbing
66. For an excellent essay sketching seven principal themes which comprise a public
philosophy, at least in the West, see Stackhouse, An Ecumenist's Plea for a Public The-
ology, THIS WORLD, Spring/Summer 1984, at 47, 58-68. The themes are as follows: nature
is not the product of chance but is created by a God, who is behind and beyond nature
and is more important than nature itself; men must care for the well-being of the poor
and the oppressed; each human is placed in the world for a purpose, which we call voca-
tion; humans are called into communities of responsibility, e.g., familial, political and
economic communities, which set forth terms and limits for our lives together; there is a
transcendent and universally valid moral law; things are not as they should be in the
world because of human failing and evil; and there must be religious freedom in both the
voluntariness of faith and the institutional separation of church and states. The
Stackhouse paper is followed by responses from five prominent and diverse students of
religion, making the discourse particularly rich. See generally J. GUSTAFSON, ETHICS FROM
A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE (1981); M. MARTY, THE PUBLIC CHURCH (1981); THE RELI-
GION OF THE REPUBLIC (E. Smith ed. 1971); J. WmSON, PUBLIC RELIGION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1979).
67. See Cox, Our Politics Needs Religion, 39 REP. FROM CAPITAL, Oct. 1984, at 4.
68. A. STORKEY, supra note 65, at 308; see generally S. MONSMA, PURSUING JUSTICE
IN A SINFUL WORLD (1984).
69. See Neuhaus, America in American Religious Thought, RELIGION & Soc'y REP.,
Nov. 1985, at 1-6.
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to the allure of nation worship.70 They view privatization of faith
and the rising tides of secularism and radical individualism as
more imminent threats.7 '
Institutional separationists agree with pluralistic separa-
tionists that civil tolerance in public discourse is important and
that one should exercise restraint in the use of religiously moti-
vated speech directed at the general polis.72 However, such pru-
dence in speech must be balanced against the imperative of cul-
ture-forming religion as foundational to civil liberties, social
justice, and republican virtues. Religion speaks to the totality of
life; there should be no dualisms. Accordingly, institutional
separationists argue that religious people must not stand mute
in the face of wrongdoing that seriously threatens community
order. And since their view of religion is that faith is to be inte-
grated with all of life, they feel that there is no subject the
church may not properly address, even when others regard its
views as intermeddling and socially intolerant and the issue at
hand as a private matter. This does not mean a politicized
church: institutional separationists insist that there is a balance
between proclaiming eternal values and addressing the present
in a practical and humble manner. Thus, they remain solidly in
the separationist camp. Although faith and life are fully inte-
grated at the individual level, church and state maintain distinct
responsibilities that should be honored as each institution fulfills
its proper role.
This third type, like the second, maintains that churches
and other religious organizations have ontological standing in
law, rather than merely the civil rights derived from individual
members.73 These two types also join in a vigorous protection of
religious-based conscience from acts of civic intolerance.
Finally, like all separationist models, institutional separa-
tionists maintain that the state may not discriminate among re-
ligious groups or prefer religion in general over individuals pro-
70. Kantzer, American Civil Religion, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 13, 1984, at 14.
71. The Subversive Society, 7 PASTORAL RENEWAL 55 (1983)
72. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 61, at 55, 114-15, 125.
73. A. STORKEY supra note 65, at 309; Richardson, Civil Religion in Theological
Perspective, in AMERCAN CiL RELIGION, at 161, 178-80 (R. Richey & D. Jones eds.
1974); see Neuhaus, That Extraordinary Synod: A Report From Rome, RELIGION &
Soc'Y REP., Mar. 1986 special report, at BI (problems can be traced to the idea "that the
church is viewed as simply a human institution to be understood in sociological terms,"
as opposed to the view that the church "is divinely constituted and divinely guided on its
pilgrimage toward a kingdom that is not of our manufacture").
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fessing no religious belief. Thus, institutional separationists
differ from nonpreferentialists in their strong feeling that reli-
gious people must not ask for governmental favor or aid which is
not available to all other citizens. 4
VI. NONPREFERENTIALISTS
Nonpreferentialists desire a nonsectarian state. Unlike the
secular state characterization of the strict separationists, non-
sectarianism is akin to nondenominationalism.
Nonpreferentialists argue that religion in general is crucial
in the formation of good morals such as honesty, industry, thrift,
charity, and sobriety. Therefore, the state has a strong interest
in preserving and fostering religious faith. This fourth type is
convinced that traditional religion is the basis for morality, that
morality is vital to achieving that critical mass of persons who
are disciplined and self-governing, and that a self-regulating citi-
zenry makes possible the open society characteristic of Western
democracy. Thus, concludes the syllogism, religion is essential to
the state's very self-preservation. 5
In sum, this means that the state may aid religion because
the public interest in a stable, democratic government is thereby
served. Nonpreferentialists agree with the institutional and plu-
ralistic separationists that the state is not competent to choose
among religions. Unlike the separationists, however, who be-
cause of this incompetence deny aid to all religions, nonprefer-
entialists would extend governmental aid to religious organiza-
tions on a nonpreferential basis.7
This view of church-state relations bears directly upon one
of the major legal debates involving the establishment clause:
state aid to parochial schools. Because nonpreferentialists view
such aid as constitutional, it comes as little surprise that many
Roman Catholics, Protestant Evangelicals and Orthodox Jews7 7
74. A. STORKEY, supra note 65, at 311.
75. See, e.g., Hatch, Civic Virtue: Wellspring of Liberty, NAT'L FORUM: PHI KAPPA
PHI J., Fall 1984, at 34; Sirico, The Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political
Process: The First Amendment and School Aid, 50 Mo. L. REv. 321 (1985).
76. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2508 (1985), espouses a nonpreferentialist view. See generally R. CORD, supra note
10; P. FERRARA, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: A REINTERPRETATION (1983); G.
GOLDBERG, RECONSECRATING AMERICA (1984); M. MALBIN, supra note 10; Hatch, supra
note 75, at 37.
77. On the Uses of Fear, RELIGION & Soc'Y REP., Dec. 1985, at 7-8 (letter from Rabbi
Davis Samuel).
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who operate their own schools are quite sympathetic to the non-
preferentialist model. Political conservatives, even if not them-
selves deeply religious, are often nonpreferentialists as well.78
Nonpreferentialists are quick to point out two additional
public benefits of a thriving religious sector. First, religious
groups give citizens a source of community in an often imper-
sonal world. Next to the family, religious organizations are the
foremost institution in society interposed between the individual
and the power of the state.79 Religious societies are a rich source
of stability and meaning in life and continuity with the past.
Second, religious groups operate many worthy educational and
charitable organizations. These services are delivered at less cost
to the public treasury than governmental programs, and often
with a quality and personal touch not achieved by governmental
bureaucracy. Moreover, the availability of church-related schools
affords students and parents a greater variety of choices, thus
enriching culture and acting as a hedge against state monopoli-
zation of the education of impressionable children. 0 Nonprefer-
entialists take the buzz words of the separationists, such as free-
dom, choice and pluralism, and turn them to their own service
by arguing that "educational freedom," "parental choice" and
"pluralism in learning experiences" support aid to parochial
schools."'
To a large extent, nonpreferentialists echo the institutional
separationist's concern that the state be limited and capable of
78. See Dannhauser, Religion and the Conservatives, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1985, at 51.
Dannbauser makes an insightful point: conservatives who favor religion for the masses,
although their own religious belief is weak or nonexistent, have embraced religion for its
social utility, as distinguished from the larger question of its claims of truth. Id. at 55.
Accordingly, their thought is in a sense Erastian, for it justifies a publicly supported
religion because of its usefulness to the state. Unlike Puritans who came to America to
set up a government that would guard the "true religion," these political conservatives
hope to use religion to protect and sustain good government. This is the very thing plu-
ralistic separationists warn against. See Littell, supra note 63, at 135-38 (1964).
79. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUC-
TURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 27-28 (1977).
80. See R. BAER, CENSORSHIP AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1985); R. MCCARTHY, J.
SKILLEN & V. HARPER, DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME: GENUINE PLURALISM FOR
AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1982); see generally FREEDOM & EDUCATION: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF
SISTERS RECONSIDERED (D. Kommers & M. Wahoske eds. 1978).
81. See J. CATTERALL, TUITION TAX CREDITS: FACT AND FICTION (1983); J. COONS & S.
SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978); Davis, Educa-
tional Vouchers: Bloom or Blunder?, 47 EDUC. F. 161 (1983); Herndon, Tuition Tax
Credits and Educational Vouchers, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 207 (J. Carper
& T. Hunt eds. 1984); Puckett, Educational Vouchers: Rhetoric and Reality, 48 EDUC. F.
7 (1983).
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being judged in light of a transcendent point of reference, so as
to check statism and make possible human rights. They also
agree that the state should not discriminate among religious or-
ganizations or among individuals on the basis of differing reli-
gious beliefs.2 However, nonpreferentialists break with all three
separationist types by permitting the state to aid or favor reli-
gion in general over those professing no religious belief. They
argue that, although the first amendment prevents the establish-
ment of a national church, the founding fathers never contem-
plated prohibiting government aid to religion on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis.8 3
Nonpreferentialists join with the second and third types in
vigorously protecting religious speech and press on an equal ba-
sis with political, philosophical or artistic expression. These
same three types also agree in their view of churches as legally
autonomous within their own sphere of operation. The state,
therefore, must abstain from interfering with the inner precincts
of religious organizations. Unlike the second and third types,
however, nonpreferentialists are persuaded that the receipt of
state aid will not lead to government entanglement which would
compromise the religious mission and internal governance of
churches.8 5
82. This is not a change from current Supreme Court case law. A statute which is
facially neutral and has no provisions which have a disparate impact on members of
different denominations is constitutional when such distinctions result from the applica-
tion of secular criteria. Compare Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (uphold-
ing a classification that differentiated on the basis of religious belief, not by denomina-
tional or sect membership) with Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (charitable
contributions tax deduction statute unlawfully discriminates against new religious
movements).
83. Meese, The Battle for the Constitution: The Attorney General Replies to His
Critics, POL'Y REv., Winter 1985, at 32. See also authorities cited, supra note 76.
84. For example, consider the opposition by Senator Orrin Hatch and the United
States Catholic Conference to various legislative proposals to overturn Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In Grove City the Court held that title IX of the 1972
educational amendments, 20 U.S.C. YY 1681-86 (1982), prohibited sex discrimination
only in any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, not the
entire educational institution. 465 U.S. at 570-74.
Critics of the various proposals to overturn Grove City have opposed these bills in
part because of their potential for intrusion into the employment practices of church-
operated schools and related ministries such as colleges and hospitals. 130 CONG. Rac.
S12146, S12155 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984) (exhibit introduced by Senator Hatch); 43
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 999-1001, 1441-42, 1950, 2745 (1985) (concerns of U.S. Catholic
Conference).
85. For a discussion of this issue in the context of state aid to religious schools, see
Capps & Esbeck, The Use of Government Funding and Taxing Power to Regulate Reli-
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Religious-based conscience is to be juridically protected, ab-
sent some truly exigent threat to health, safety, or public order.
Nonpreferentialists are divided, however, when confronted with
a claim of conscientious exemption from otherwise generally ap-
plicable and facially neutral legislation. Consider, for example,
the free exercise clause claim for exemption upheld in Thomas v.
Review Board.s6 Because of a sincere religious belief that he
could not work on military armaments, a factory worker was dis-
charged by his employer. The state, taking the view that the loss
of employment was voluntary, denied the worker unemployment
compensation. The Supreme Court held that this denial violated
the worker's free exercise clause rights to follow the dictates of
religious belief without suffering a substantial burden at the
hand of the state.
Some nonpreferentialists, agreeing with institutional and
pluralistic separationists, follow the Court's view in Thomas.
Other nonpreferentialists disagree, believing that the free exer-
cise clause should relieve a religious claimant only of unavoida-
ble burdens on conscience.8 7 These nonpreferentialists give
greater deference to the operation of state police power. In their
view, conscience is violated only when the state, without provid-
ing an alternative, prohibits an act that religious faith mandates,
or commands an act that faith enjoins.88
VII. RESTORATIONISTS
Restorationists desire a confessional state. Many of this
fifth type believe that America was founded as a Christian na-
tion,"' and they seek to restore Christianity to the status it en-
joyed during the colonial and early national periods.90
gious Schools, 14 J. L. & EDUC. 553 (1985).
86. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
87. See, e.g., M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITIcs: THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHORS OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 36-40 (1978).
88. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (urging a narrower scope for the free exercise clause, as set forth in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring opinion) (urging a similar retreat from the Thomas free exercise
clause analysis).
89. The idea has persisted in America that the United States is fundamentally a
Christian republic, and that the role of the church is to build toward the time when
American civilization would be fully Christian and Christian principles would triumph.
For an introduction to the study of this American idea, see R. HANDY, supra note 8; E.
TUVESON, REDEEMER NATION: THE IDEA OF AMERICA'S MILLENNIAL ROLE (1968).
90. One of the first books to forcefully advance the restorationist's position of a
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Restorationists argue that there is no easy dualism between
the secular and the religious, that a neutral state is not only a
myth, but an impossibility. The state cannot avoid being com-
mitted to some ultimate principles, and these animating princi-
ples, broadly defined, constitute the "religion" of the state.
Thus, for restorationists, the only relevant question is whether
the state's guiding reality is the true one. Restorationist litera-
ture is replete with warnings that the guiding reality of many of
America's governmental institutions is increasingly the false reli-
gion of "secular humanism."
According to restorationists, a universal, transcendent point
of reference for the state not only exists but is unavoidable. In
the restorationist model, church and state are divinely ordained
and are intended to reinforce each other in a symbiotic relation-
ship. Although this mutual dependence between church and
state is inevitable, each has a distinct role and is not to invade
the jurisdiction assigned to the other within the created order.
Hence, this model does not contemplate a radical theocracy, in
the sense of a complete merger of church and state. Nor is the
restorationist view Constantinian, which would entail a single
benevolent head for both church and state.
Restorationists envision a government possessing primarily
protectionist duties such as law enforcement, military defense,
conduct of foreign relations, and assuring public health and
safety. They thus seek a minimalist state, one whose domestic
authority is for the most part limited to containing the excesses
"Christian America" was R. WALTON, ONE NATION UNDER GOD (1975); later came others
such as THE CHRISTIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (V. Hall ed. 1976); J.
MONTGOMERY, THE SHAPING OF AMERICA (1976). Perhaps more widely read is F. SHAEF-
FER, How SHOULD WE THEN LIVE (1976) (covering more than simply America's founding,
but claiming an early Christian base for the nation, which Shaeffer believes is presently
lost and is in need of restoration). These were followed by books such as H. BROWN, THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC (1977); 2 THE CHRISTIAN HISTORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (V. Hall ed. 1979); P. MARSHALL & D. MANUEL,
THE LIGHT AND THE GLORY (1977); R. SLATER, TEACHING AND LEARNING AMERICA'S CHRIS-
TIAN HISTORY (1980); J. WHITEHEAD, THE SEPARATION ILLUSION: A LAWYER EXAMINES THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1977). More recent books include J. FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA
(1980); F. SHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO (1981); W. STANMEYER, CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER: CHURCH AND STATE IN POST-CHRISTIAN AMERICA (1983); J. WHITEHEAD, THE SEC-
OND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1982).
For restorationist views that are hyper-Calvinist, or what the authors themselves
term "Christian reconstructionist," see G. BAHNSEN, BY THIS STANDARD: THE AUTHORITY
OF GOD'S LAW TODAY (1985); R. RUSHDOONY, THIS INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC (1964). Al-
though the tone and content of the Christian reconstructionist perspective borders on
triumphalism, the view appears to be to the right of most within our restorationist type.
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of immorality. Clearly such a view excludes direct state author-
ity over the affairs of the church. Instead, the state is to provide
a social environment where religious claims are more plausible
and conversion therefore more likely. Ideally, the state is to be a
magisterial government that serves as "nursing father" ' to the
church.
Restorationists believe that the United States is a Christian
nation 92 or was originally intended as one, and they often argue
for a restoration of the nation's high view of Christianity as it
existed in the founding period. Not only is the public theology
of the state explicitly Christian in its creed, but much of restora-
tionism has a decidedly Puritan or at least a "chosen people"
cast to it. Prayers frequently invoke God's judgment or blessing
upon not only individuals, but the entire nation.94
Because they assign the state a duty-albeit a mild duty
91. See T. CURRY, supra note 8, at 17.
92. See supra notes 89-90. For contrary views, see M. NOLL, N. HATCH & G. MARS-
DEN, supra note 8; Noll, From the Great Awakening to the War for Independence:
Christian Values in the American Revolution, 12 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REv. 99 (1983).
93. For insight into the contending sides in this debate, consider AMERICA, CHRIS-
TIAN OR SECULAR? (J. Herbert ed. 1984):
We can see that the proponents and critics of a Christian America empha-
size different things. The critics look at America's public philosophy and are
hard pressed to find anything distinctly Christian. The proponents look at the
rhetoric of the founders and the courts, see the connections between America's
early legal tradition and English common law, and find much that is Christian.
.. .Both sides of the Christian America debate recognize the connection
between how Christians perceive the founding of America and how they will
act in American public life today. On the one side are Christians who perceive
America's traditional consensus as being basically Christian. They would hope,
of course, that America's public consensus (civil religion) might be as purely
Christian as possible. But however mixed it might remain, they urge Christians
to revitalize American society by working politically and legally to renew, per-
fect, and sustain the "Christian base" that was part of America's traditional
civil religion.
On the other side are Christians who perceive America's traditional civil
religion to be a synthesis of Christian and non-Christian influences. They be-
lieve that there is a fundamental difference between biblical norms and values
and the received norms and values of Western culture, particularly as they
were given expression by the Enlightenment. They believe mixing such norms
and values, as is done in American civil religion, subverts truly Christian (bib-
lical) public action. They urge Christians to acknowledge the fundamental dif-
ference between biblical norms and the pervasive public philosophy of
America's founding, and to work toward truly biblically based public and polit-
ical service.
Id. at 22, 25-26 (footnotes omitted).
94. See, e.g., W. STANMEYER, supra note 90, at 51.
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that is in practice largely passive-to protect and defend the
Christian faith, the restorationist position on freedom of expres-
sion, church autonomy and official discrimination on religious
bases is different from the four other types. Restorationists
would generally protect the religious speech and press of all per-
suasions. However, they would restrain speech which slanders
Christianity in particularly egregious circumstances, as in prose-
cution for blasphemy. Under their model, government, when it
exercises its considerable powers of expression, would show be-
nevolence toward the Christian faith. For example, the prayers
of a legislative chaplain might well be overtly Christian in con-
tent. Official endorsement of the majority faith might also occur
through enforcement of the Sabbath and government holidays
coinciding with Christian holy days.
Churches and other religious organizations obviously would
have institutional rights under the restorationist view. Restora-
tionists regard official favor of Christianity as a very different
matter from governmental interference in church affairs. They
insist that churches govern themselves and control their own in-
ternal affairs. It is true that symbiosis between the state and
Christianity would lead to numerous interactions between the
state and Christian churches, and that such interaction would
lead to some entanglement. Indeed, occasional friction is inevita-
ble. Restorationists believe, however, that such friction can be
held to a tolerable level.
Because restorationists envision a minimalist state, they do
not contemplate a state that discriminates among religions in
dispensing state aid, tax benefits or other governmental favors.
Restorationists do not believe that government has an affirma-
tive role in domestic matters such as social welfare. 95 Thus, dis-
crimination in state aid would ordinarily not arise as an issue.
Finally, restorationists join all other groups in protecting to
a high degree religious-based conscience, albeit out of a different
rationale. Those who are not Christian are regarded as minority
religions or dissenters. Dissenters would have full rights of con-
science under the free exercise clause, even though there would
95. Consider H. TITUS, EDUCATION-CAESAR'S OR GOD'S: A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
OF JURISDICTION (1985), advancing the thesis that education is not within the jurisdiction
of the state and thus "public education and other government regulations of education
constitute clear violations of the First Amendment." Id. at 7. Rather, Titus believes,
when we separate church from state as the establishment clause requires, education be-
longs exclusively "to the family, the church, and God." Id. at 6.
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be no separation of church and state under the establishment
clause as contemplated by the three separationist types. Thus,
utilizing the three elements of our definition of religious lib-
erty,96 restorationists would grant to everyone full juridical
rights for religious-based conscience. At the same time, restora-
tionists would have the relationship between church and state be
a de jure approbation of Christianity. Surely, they point out,
there can be full rights of conscience even when there is one es-
tablished religion, as in England, Scotland, and Scandinavia.
That being so, restorationists contend that their model is even
less radical than that which exists elsewhere in the West. They
urge no established national church; only official, if passive, be-
nevolence toward the Christian faith. 8
Although the separationist types often accuse them of intol-
erance, restorationists have no intention of engaging in religious
persecution in the sense of coercion of conscience. They recog-
nize that conversion to Christianity, if it is to be sincere, must
be wholly voluntary. Accordingly, the state should prefer the
Christian faith, which they believe would subtly encourage con-
version, while refraining from acts of intolerance toward
dissenters.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Each model in this five-part typology has a different theo-
retical conception of what the state ought to be, ranging from
wholly secular to unabashedly confessional of historic Christian-
ity. In the area of ecclesiology, however, the five types are in
greater accord. Only strict separationists regard the church as a
voluntarily association having no religious liberty apart from the
free exercise rights of individual members. Predictably, this lat-
ter two-way split in church-state theory is the source of consid-
erable litigation today, as proponents of these various types
carry the struggle concerning church autonomy into the courts.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
97. For an interesting account of the present status of the established church in
England, see Barker, The British Right to Discriminate, TRANSACTION: SOC. SCL & MOD-
ERN Soc'v, May/June 1984, at 35.
98. One author refers to America's established religion of an earlier era as "pan-
Protestant Christianity." W. STANMEYER, supra note 90, at 1. Another speaks of a lost
"Christian Reformation base." F. SHAEFFER, supra note 90, at 110, 249. Still another
hinges the nation's founding on a "Judeo-Christian base." J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 90,
at 32.
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The docket of cases litigating the question of governmental in-
terference in religious affairs is continuously growing.99
It remains to be noted which theory in our social typology
accords most nearly with the present state of first amendment
doctrine in the courts. If one measures by results rather than
rationale, since the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Educa-
99. Kelley, Frontier Issues of Religious Liberty, REP. FROM CAPITAL, May 1985, at
10-11, lists fifteen different types of cases involving governmental interference in church-
related ministries:
1. In intradenominational disputes, courts effectively treating hierarchical
and connectional denominations as if their polity was congregational, resulting
in local congregations breaking away and taking church real estate with them.
2. The Internal Revenue Service defining the "integrated auxiliaries" of a
church in such a way as to exclude church-related colleges and children's
homes as not being "exclusively religious," even if the church considers them
integral to its mission.
3. Designation of church buildings as "historic landmarks" so as to impose
duties of maintenance without regard to the church's mission or financial abil-
ity to pay for repairs.
4. Imposition of liability on the larger denomination for torts of a local
congregation despite absence of -ight to control actions of the local body.
5. Refusal to honor the claims of testimonial privilege that arises in the
course of pastoral counseling.
6. Charitable solicitation regulations that do not exempt religious
organizations.
7. Requirements that churches register as lobbyists and report their activi-
ties and expenditures to the state legislature.
8. Regulation of church-related day schools, in some instances going be-
yond legitimate health and safety concerns.
9. Siding with dissident church members by placing a church into receiver-
ship pending investigation of charges by dissidents that church assets were be-
ing misspent.
10. A court's refusal to dismiss suit by a private organization to remove
the tax-exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church for opposing pro-abor-
tion candidates for political office.
11. A court's refusal to dismiss suit by nuns who sued their bishop for
discharging them from teaching positions in a parochial school.
12. A court's refusal to dismiss suit by a former church member who sued
the church and its bishop for ordering discipline for infraction of church rules.
13. A court's refusal to dismiss suit by church members who sued their
bishop for relocating the altar as directed by the liturgical reforms of the Vati-
can Council.
14. The courts' refusal to dismiss suits by past members of new religious
movements ("cults") for a variety of alleged torts, including fraud, outrageous
conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
15. A court's refusal to order dismissal of suit by parents of young man
against church and its pastor for alleged clergy malpractice in counseling their
son, who committed suicide.
For collections of papers presented at two conferences on this general topic of
church autonomy, see GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS II (D. Kelley ed.
1986); GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
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tion,100 the Supreme Court's direction generally follows the
views of pluralistic separationists: church and state are separate,
but not hostile; religious speech is protected on a parity with
other speech; and religious-based conscience is substantially ac-
commodated. To be sure, some cases, such as Mueller v. Al-
len,10 1 Lynch v. Donnelly10 2 and Marsh v. Chambers,10 3 are nota-
ble exceptions to the views of our second type. But these cases
are just that: exceptions to prevailing Supreme Court doctrine.
Moreover, since the choice of any one of the five types to the
exclusion of the other four implicates both one's theology and
one's political theory, it should come as no surprise that those
most critical of the Supreme Court stand outside the pluralistic
separationist tradition.
Given these two complex realities, church and state, a con-
tinuous dialogue must proceed to enable adjustments in their in-
terrelationship, in order to cope with changing realities. The dia-
lectic is often disharmonious and consists of denials and
affirmations, charges and recriminations, reconstructions and
compromises. Neither church nor state will achieve a final rest-
ing place that does not provoke a new rejoinder. Yet it is possi-
ble to discern some order in this multiplicity: to stop the dia-
logue, as it were, and name and describe the major players at the
present, and to do so with subtlety and fairness. Such has been
the motivation of this essay, combined with the hope that a
fresh vocabulary will channel the future dialogue in ways that
are constructive without being overly confining. Moreover, as we
begin to understand others, we will understand better the
presuppositions that we ourselves bring to the debate.
Overconfident assertions concerning sensitive and compli-
cated matters are dangerous, especially when they concern as
ancient a problem as church-state relations. No doubt some will
feel slighted because their views are omitted. Others will be dis-
turbed, believing their position is not accurately portrayed. They
are invited to join this endeavor and propose needed adjust-
100. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). This case is often cited as the beginning of the Supreme
Court's modern jurisprudence concerning the first amendment and religious liberty.
Prior to Everson the Court had passed on only a handful of matters touching religion.
101. 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for tuition paid by
parents of parochial school children).
102. 465 U.S. 668, (1984) (upholding annual display in city park of Christmas creche
or nativity scene).
103. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska legislature's practice of beginning
each day with a prayer by a government-paid chaplain).
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ments. We need only agree at the outset that a vocabulary is
required so that citizens who care deeply about religion in
America are equipped to talk with one another with less heat
and more light.
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